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action or later. Please see Debugging in WordPress for more information. (This message was added in version 6.7.0.) in /home/emirresea/public_html/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6114Published in Malay Mail<\/a>, Astro Awani<\/a>, Business Today<\/a>, Focus Malaysia<\/a>, The Star<\/a> & MYsinchew<\/a>, image by Astro Awani<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We know that incompetent, haphazard and obscure top governance over the years has already exposed Malaysia to serious risks on many fronts from the raging Covid-19 pandemic to the complete loss of competitiveness in advancing the Fourth Industrial Revolution to the brain drain. Yet, another danger might be looming on the horizon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malaysia might be riper than ever for another round of speculative pressure on its currency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seminal research in economics and finance over the decades established that the strongest predictors of imminent speculative attack among many factors are the behaviour of international reserves, the real exchange rate, domestic credit, credit of the public sector, and domestic inflation<\/strong>. The appearance of any of these indicators or, more so, their combination severely curtails the government ability to defend a speculative attempt to devalue national currency successfully.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For instance, stagnated or depleted international reserves<\/strong> void the government’s capacity to maintain its currency within predetermined bounds by dumping international reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sliding exchange rate<\/strong>, especially in combination with the belief that this trend will continue (based on fundamentals), informs speculators that the government of a targeted country would not opt for the strategy of aggressive borrowing in foreign currencies to stem speculative attack as long-term depreciation will only increase the costs of repayments \u2013 both principals and interest rates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Expansion of the domestic credit, as well as credit to the public,<\/strong> make intervention through interest rate increase implausible option as doing so may push a large proportion of individuals and companies into default and send turmoil through the entire financial system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This strategy of currency defeat is also not an option in case of rising domestic inflation<\/strong> as it will undoubtedly send domestic inflation to new highs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the above conditions are all met, the government of a targeted country is basically “trapped” or “ripe” for the successful speculative currency attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Depleting international reserves<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The following long historical data (see the graph) shows Bank Negara Malaysia’s (BNM) foreign currencies reserves levels together with the corresponding USD\/MYR movements. Note how Malaysia could not rebuild even 50% of its foreign reserves since its fall from USD128.2 billion in mid-May 2013 to USD85.2 billion<\/strong> in mid-September 2015 on one of the greatest ringgit slides since the Asian Financial crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Also, our foreign reserves are currently just above that psychological USD100 billion mark (at USD103.9 as of November 30, 2021, according to the BNM report).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Data source: Bank Negara Malaysia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Gloomy long-term outlook for ringgit<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Looking at the long-term behaviour of our currency (refer to the same graph), the ringgit has been ranging in the broad channel of RM3.900 to 4.500 to USD since 2016, probably falling victim to profitable range trading.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Note the pair’s strong and sharp bounces every time it nears RM3.900\u20134.000 region, indicating a massive number of sell orders stacked at those levels. At the same time, the currency pair less and less reluctantly comes down. This, in turn, indicates investors’ firm belief that our currency is poised for long-term depreciation<\/strong> based on the country’s weak fundamentals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is very significant, as since 2016\u2014the onset of the 4th industrial revolution (4IR)\u2014many, even developing, countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, for example) set their sight on harnessing 4IR potential and gearing it towards building national self-sufficiency and resilience while combating all sorts of inefficiencies (including corruption).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unfortunately, during the same period, Malaysian governance was distracted and derailed by unprecedented politicking, power, and money-grab at all levels. Notably, the literature suggests political instability, weak national governance, inconsistency and uncertainty of national policies as yet other strong predictors of national currency attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The graph above, too, clearly illustrates how politics and corruption have contributed to the ringgit’s wounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Where citizens of the country close their eyes, investors and speculators (not necessary foreign) may see profitable opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Debt-ridden nation for generations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n We are a highly debt-ridden nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malaysia’s private sector debt (businesses and households included) as a percentage of GDP has been on the steep rise since 2008 (graph below)\u2014jumping from 96% of GDP to 134%. Note that Malaysia’s private sector debt was at its highest (158% of GDP) just before the 1997 Financial Crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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