Published by The Carnegie Moscow Center, image from The Carnegie Moscow Center.
The Islamic Republic today faces a crisis of legitimacy, and the protests of last year reminded the authorities that there are big problems with the quality of governance in Iran. But, taking into account the attitudes of the revolutionaries of 1979, to which they are still listening, we can conclude that Iran is not facing another classic revolution yet. Rather, the country is ready for another white revolution — timely reforms for which no one will need to die.
The fortieth anniversary of the Iranian revolution of 1979 for many was a reason to discuss again not only what it led to, but also the direction in which Iran is moving now. While Washington is assuring that the US is not interested in the regime change, but only in “changing the behavior” of Iran, Tehran is quite openly studying whether there are preconditions for another revolution. Or counterrevolution.
For Islam or against Shah?
The Iranian events of 1979 are one of the most vivid cases of revolution in world history. Over the past four decades, they have been studied far and wide. Although some documents of that period are permanently lost, or, conversely, are still not put into scientific use, the variety of factors that determined the course of events leaves room for different interpretations.
The attractiveness of the Iranian revolution as a case-study lies precisely in the ideal convergence of streams of various strengths and origins that have washed away (possibly forever) the Shah’s rule. When speaking about Iran in the late 1970s, one cannot say that it was only economic problems that led to the uprising of the poorest segments of the society, or that the pressure of the authorities on the Islamic clergy forced people from the seminaries in the city of Qom to take the lead in the coup.
A critical mass of dissatisfaction gathered from various sources: from large-scale investments in the armed forces and the intelligence organization, SAVAK – with enhanced control over the manifestation of dissent; from the lush international celebration of the 2500th anniversary of Persepolis in 1971 against the backdrop of the extreme poverty of some regions; from an unprecedented influx of petrodollars in the mid-1970s and numerous questions about how these petrodollars were spent; of the generous promises of Ayatollah Khomeini to make electricity and public transport free, sounding from audio cassettes, which he sent to Iran from his exile overseas.
Trying to determine the exact proportion of each of these factors is unlikely to result in success. But it is important to note that, with all the Shah’s modernization activities, society experienced a sense of relative deprivation. This feeling does not depend on absolute indicators; it grows out of the conviction that the state possesses significant resources, but, for example, uses them in the interests of the Shah personally, and not the nation as a whole. And all this was accompanied by the violation of rights and freedoms, the attack on traditions. In addition to everything, this was perceived to be, happening on the orders of the de facto colonial master represented by the United States.
This feeling of relative deprivation arises at the moment when expectations are not met. For example, if the state consistently distributed some subsidies, created jobs, built infrastructure facilities but then suddenly stopped doing it. Or, on the contrary, after a long wait for improvements and corresponding promises, there was no improvement.
Such unfulfilled expectations are associated with theories of revolution, originating in psychology. Analysts talk about emerging frustration in the society. The real situation (in particular, the level of poverty) is certainly important, but sometimes not as much as its perception, and it can be shaped by various factors. Would the then twenty-year-old Iranians find their perception wrong 40 years later? For some, the answer is yes.
The strong ideological component of the revolution will later give it the name “Islamic”. But the variety of reasons for which it occurred and its diverse social base will determine its more general orientation as anti-Shah, as an attempt to restore justice by overthrowing Pahlavi. In fact, of the total amount of revolutionary slogans, researchers counted only a quarter of those demanding the establishment of an Islamic republic.
What did they fight for
Why are reflections on the events from forty years ago relevant for today’s discussions about the possibility of another overthrow in the political history of Iran?
The topic of a potential change of power is still delicate and inconvenient for Iranian society, despite it being discussed in social media and in private gatherings. For 40 years, revolutionism has become one of the foundations of the new Iranian identity. The very word “revolutionary” is today understood by Iranians as being true to the ideas and values of the 1979 revolution. Therefore, the discussion, albeit as a hypothetical possibility that the Islamic republic will cease to exist, can be perceived as disrespectful for those who worked and continues to work for the cause of the revolution, and even to the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war that followed the revolution.
Nevertheless, this topic is discussed in the Iranian academic environment. And not only in response to the hidden and more or less open American attempts to change the regime, but also responding to the questions from within Iran. The economic situation has the greatest weight in this discussion. People are thinking if it was was worth making a revolution meant to attain justice and establish a social state, while what they eventually attained is an exorbitant level of corruption, inflation, unemployment, and international isolation?
The socioeconomic protests that have been going on in different cities of Iran since the end of 2017 have forced the Iranians to once again recall the revolutionary theories associated with a sense of relative deprivation. Only this time, the pre-election promises of President Rouhani to solve all the problems of Iran through a nuclear deal can be the source of this attitude.
The promised improvement did not happen. In May 2018, the Donald Trump administration announced that it was withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan on tIran’s nuclear program. By November 2018, he restored unilateral sanctions and even increased pressure on Iran for developing the missile program and interfering into the affairs of its neighbors in the Middle East.
The Iranians did not manage to get economic benefits in the short period since January 2016, when all parties retained their commitment to the nuclear deal, or after – when the EU promised to create a special financial mechanism to pay for Iranian oil bypassing US secondary sanctions. Unfulfilled expectations again created a protest potential.
The market of ideas
The available sociological information (especially considering the degree of its reliability) is not enough to get a clear idea of the possibility of drastic social and political changes in modern Iran. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the picture of modern Iranian society is not at all as black and white as many would like to think. In Iran, there are no two opposing trends for and against the shift with an amorphous gray mass in the middle.
A large number of people dissatisfied with the economic situation does not mean either the possibility of mobilizing them under common banners, or even a common vision of who and what they need to fight against. One of the main reasons is the memory of the generation of participants in the revolution forty years ago.
Iranian researchers (for example, Mohammadreza Tadjik, adviser to the former president-reformer Khatami) confirm that now in Iran there is neither a charismatic leader, nor an attractive ideology for another revolution. New Ali Shariatis were not born yet. Another reason Professor Tajik considers is the absence of an established alternative to the existing system, especially in a troubled regional and international context when there are no guarantees that another coup will result in the creation of a new effective regime.
Others, such as Saeed Hajarian, a political scientist of the reformist movement, analyze several possible scenarios, among which there are a classic or color revolution, and US military intervention, and even a collapse from within. Recalling that justice and freedom were the main requirements of the revolutionary movement in the 1970s, Dr. Hajarian, in fact, suggests reconsidering the perception of Islam that was established after the revolution as something emanating from written law. Instead, he suggests returning to the source, talking about the importance of fundamental principles of the revolution, for which Islam has become a mobilizing ideology.
Official rhetoric supports the idea of national harmony and even welcomes the growth of external pressure as a means to unite people against foreign interference in the affairs of the country. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif noted that the people are the basis of Iran’s security and stability, so the threat of a regime change from the outside should not be taken seriously.
Chances for counterrevolution
Dr. Tajik, like many observers, is right that there are no necessary prerequisites for a new revolution, whether it will be counter-revolution with the restoration of the monarchy or a replacement of the existing system with something new. However, can we be sure that at the next stage of the Iranian history, the changes will be gradual?
The social base of the 1979 events was very diverse. In 2009, the largest protests of the times against the Islamic Republic were mainly attended by the middle class, outraged by reportedly rigged presidential elections. Now the Iranian middle class prefers to watch the protests from the outside. From December 2017, it was the poorest strata who suffered the most from economic difficulties and took to the streets.
The middle class, especially those who managed to take part in the revolution of 1979, fell into a state of depressive anabiosis: a request for change was formed, but nobody is ready to take radical steps for the situation not to become worse. Experts identify the loss of people’s trust in each other, politicians and government institutions as one of the most serious problems in modern Iran. Those who position themselves as alternatives, such as the terrorist Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization or the politically active heir to the Pahlavi dynasty living in the United States, also do not enjoy exceptional trust.
Excerpts from an interview by Najmeh Bozorgmehr with Iranians, published by the Financial Times, confirm the state of the psychological deadlock: rejection of what grew out of the revolution and the lack of determination to change anything.
60% of the 82 million Iranian population is now under 30, which means that the generation of frustrated revolutionaries is gradually fading away. However, their cautions – stemming from past experiences – affect potential mobilization. Therefore, the radical deterioration of the economic situation, affecting the most basic needs, remains the main reason for real mass protests.
As for the nostalgia for Shah’s Iran, when “Iranians were respected” in the international arena, it ends with the question of how much more progressive and thriving Iran would be now, if Mohammadreza Pahlavi had kept his throne 40 years ago. To some Iranians, it is difficult to answer. Nostalgia for the Shah is understandable as a companion to the pursuit of change, but as an ideology for another regime change, there is little that it can offer to solve today’s problems.
The Islamic Republic today faces a crisis of legitimacy and addresses this issue in various forms in the public space. Iranian Instagram accounts told the whole world how Tehran’s “golden children” spend time while most bear the burden of sanctions. The fact that Iran has big problems with the quality of management was reminded to the authorities by the protests of last year. But, taking into account the attitudes of the revolutionaries of 1979, to which people are still listening, we can conclude that Iran is not facing another classic revolution yet. Rather, the country is ready for another “white revolution” — timely reforms for which no one will need to die.
Julia Roknifard is Director of Foreign Policy at EMIR Research, an independent think-tank focused on strategic policy recommendations based upon rigorous research.
